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I.1 – Foreword 
 
 
The issue of transferred loss has received little attention under the common law (if not 
also under the civil law). In fact, even the concept of transferred loss is somewhat alien 
to the common law and can be said to have been inspired by drittschadensliquidation – 
a German concept.  
 
The concept of drittschadensliquidation emerged in earlier Germany, being presented as 
result of the short comings of a very strict tort law system, while the concept of 
transferred loss emerges as result of the short comings of a very strict law of contract. In 
both cases, facts and judicial decisions preceded most doctrinal elaboration on the 
subject. In face of a reality for which the preexisting legal regime gave insufficient 
(unsatisfactory) answers, the courts forged new answers.  
 
Such answers came up most notably in sets of cases, of particular fields. Nowadays, it is 
still unclear whether there is a general principle of drittschadensliquidation or if 
drittschadensliquidation has resulted in exceptions to be applied only in such cases. To 
a certain extent, in relation to transferred loss, the XX century may represent for English 
law of contract what the XIX century represented for German Law. 
 
In English law, although transferred loss has received few attention by scholars and case 
law hasn’t often referred to it; the legal reality it intends to describe and the cases to 
which it may apply are overwhelming. Transferred loss may or may not be a legal 
regime, but it certainly is a reality, as we shall see. As such, one must not ignore such 
reality and one must seek which answers does the legal system provide. 
 
In fact, transferred loss is a matter of defining which concepts are to be used, from 
which angle should the law be interpreted and how should the acts of parties interact 
with law. Although transferred loss has often not been fully studied under English law, 
it is unquestionable that such reality exists and there must be a legal answer for it 
(whether satisfactory or not). 
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The issue is how we frame the question to be answered. We may take the angle of the 
existing legal regimes and from that on seek to which cases it may apply. Or, we may 
take the angle of existing cases and situations and from that on see which legal solutions 
may apply. Both are viable, both provide answers – and supposedly should provide the 
same answer. 
 
In this paper we do not claim at start the existence of a transferred loss principle (a 
general principle of law or comprehensive legal regime), nor do we develop our 
research from any specific legal regime to the cases to which it may apply. On the 
contrary, we take a specific problem, we bring down the issues it raises and then we 
focus on identifying the most important judicial decisions. In doing so, one must always 
take into account that law is not an exact science. 
 
As such, this paper doesn’t import the concept of drittschadensliquidation. What this 
paper does is to take transferred loss (as defined infra) as an operative concept. And to 
the extent that such concept describes a set of cases that globally refer to a common 
problem that is, therefore, considered under a common heading: transferred loss. This 
paper does not intend to import the solutions of German law, nor to appraise its virtues. 
What we take as starting point is a problem defined in a similar way to the one how it 
was identified in Germany. 
 
That said, one must not ignore that we are partially within the realm of one of the most 
essential paradigms in the English law of contract: privity – the multisecular foundation 
from which the binding force of contracts is legally derived. As such, most common law 
scholars have considered this issue merely from the angle of privity: what is privity, to 
which extent is privity applicable and, eventually, what are its shortcomings. For those 
who do not relinquish privity as a quasi sacred quintessential flawless foundation of 
contract law, then alternatives (and complements) to current contractual liability seem 
pointless – as they would imply a shortcoming of privity. 
 
The latter excluded the admissibility of contracts with protective effects towards third 
parties – as we shall see infra. The exclusion of such contractual alternative, reinforcing 
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the orthodoxy of privity, strengthened the acuteness of this issue. The problem of 
transferred loss could be partially answered by contracts with protective effects towards 
third parties, a theory that is gaining consistency in civil law countries. 
 
In the absence of such contractual alternative, what are we left with? An unsolved 
problem? A persistent orthodoxy? Or the emergence of new paradigms? 
 
 
From an unsolved transferred loss problem… 
… can a transferred loss principle emerge? 
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I.2 – The problem 
 
On both common law and civil law systems there is a distinction between contractual 
and tort law liability. On the one hand, contract law provides redress mechanisms under 
which creditors may claim compensation for the damages caused by the debtors’ 
default. On the other hand, tort law provides redress mechanisms under which one may 
claim compensation for damages caused by others irrespectively of contract. Each legal 
system then adjusts and provides specific criteria. 
 
The distinction between both relies on the special relation that exists between debtor 
and creditor, a relation that is created by one’s will, namely, through contract. As such, 
many legal orders create better conditions for the creditor to recover in contract 
damages caused by the debtor’s default, than for any one to recover in tort from 
damages caused by others. 
 
This (at least) two millennia old paradigm, takes into account the distinction between 
the commitment of the debtor / the confidence it creates on the creditor and the damages 
created without such personal commitment / confidence. The problem emerges when 
applying this model to cases in which there is commitment / confidence (created by acts 
of one’s will), which is breached, but whose damage is caused to a party to which no 
primary obligation is owed. When there is a contract, the contract is breached, but the 
damages of such breach are caused to a third party, how should the paradigm be 
applied? 
 
The traditional answer is to consider that the scope of contract law only applies between 
creditor and debtor of primary obligations, because only in such case there is the special 
relation (most times of a contractual nature) prescribed by law. As such, outside of the 
aforementioned scope, only tort law could be applied. 
 
What if there was an indirect contractual relation between all parties? What if in spite of 
the absence of a proper debtor-creditor relationship between who causes the damage and 
who suffers it, there was still personal commitment / confidence? What if a damage is 
  
C A T Ó L I C A  G L O B A L  S C H O O L  O F  L A W  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
12 
excluded from the contractual scope precisely by another contract with a different 
party? 
 
All this questions have traditionally received negative answers, because of how privity 
in common law and the primacy of contract in civil law were upheld. This strict 
interpretation had as a starting point the argument that a contract creating an obligation 
could not be affected by third parties: its performance or default relied merely on the 
parties; its default could only harm the creditor. 
 
Facts have superseded the longstanding legal theories. Let’s imagine: A has a contract 
with B; A has a contract with C. The default by B may make it impossible for A to 
fulfill its contractual obligations to C. The default by B may cause no harm to A. The 
default by B, may cause the default by A, which may cause significant damages to C. 
 
In this situation, under contract law we may find ourselves in the following paradigm: B 
defaults its obligations and such default causes damages; A cannot claim compensation 
because A had no damages
1
; C has damages but cannot claim compensation because C 
isn’t a party to the contract. There is dissociation between the right to claim 
compensation and the actual loss, that enables to claim such compensation – this is the 
essence of transferred loss. 
 
It should be noted that such dissociation isn’t necessarily regarded as problematic. 
Atiyah, although not addressing specifically the transferred loss issue, strongly criticizes 
the developments of legal compensation mechanisms, considering that “[t]he legal 
system is helping to create a „blame culture‟ in which people have a strong financial 
incentive to blame others for loss or death or injury”2. In fact, the remarks Atiyah 
addresses in relation to personal injuries can be equally applicable to transferred loss: 
 
“How fair is the system? The answer is that the system is about as fair as a 
lottery. In fact it is not too much to say that it is a lottery, a lottery by law. It is 
                                                 
1 We are taking, as a starting point, a non-nominal concept of damages. 
2  (Atiyah, 1997) 
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almost a matter of chance whether you can obtain damages (…); it is almost a 
matter of chance who will pay them; it is almost a matter of chance how much 
you will get.”  (Atiyah, 1997) 
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I.3 – An at least two-millennia old debate 
 
The main concepts regarding the contractual rights of third parties – known in English 
law as the privity doctrine – were already known to roman lawyers. Under roman law 
such concepts were known as res inter alios acta, neque nocere, neque prodesse potest 
(the acts between others may not harm nor benefit further ones), alteri stipulari nemo 
potest
3
 (no one may agree in lieu of another) and per extraneam personam nihil adquiri 
posse (nothing shall be acquired through an extraneous person)
4
. 
 
Alteri stipulari nemo potest, as prescribed by the Justinian’s Institutes, meant it was not 
possible to stipulate in favor of a third party. Although the verbal contract of stipulation 
(stipulari) was a specific contract under roman law, this principle may have been 
applicable to any contract in favor of an absent beneficiary
5
.  Two exceptions were 
known: the cases when the stipulator had a monetary interest in the performance for the 
third party (e.g., the payment to the stipulators creditors) and when a penalty clause was 
established. In both cases the stipulator would acquire a right and would be allowed to 
judicially claim such right. No one but the stipulator in the aforementioned cases could 
claim contractual rights. Exceptional cases in which the third party has the right to 
enforce contractual performance can even be found in the Corpus Iuris. 
 
An analysis of such roman law concepts, despite of their importance to the development 
of civil law, shall not be carried on in this paper. What is important to retain is that 
privity-like doctrines already existed in ancient roman law and that such concepts were 
later developed in the ius commune – with some limited exception towards third parties 
having been recognized.  
  
                                                 
3 Also quoted as stipulari alteri nemo potest 
4 (Hallebeek & Dondorp, 2008) 
5  (Hallebeek & Dondorp, 2008) 
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I.4 – The German perspective: drittschadensliquidation 
 
I.4.1 – The German concept of drittschadensliquidation 
 
Drittschadensliquidation was construed as a judge-made concept under which the 
creditor might claim in contract for the loss of a third party, to whom the creditor’s loss 
had been transferred. It is still controversial if such concept is to be considered as a legal 
doctrine (applicable in general to cases of loss’ transfer) or as an heading for specific 
judicially recognized exceptions (applicable only in analogous circumstances to 
prototypical cases). 
 
There is a long standing legal debate on the theoretical basis of 
drittschadensliquidation. To a certain extent, such debate amounts to the debate in 
English law regarding the several grounds on which transferred loss could be 
considered (narrow versus broad grounds), which we shall see infra. 
 
In fact, German courts had accepted drittschadensliquidation, considering it to derive 
parties’ will – and, as such, recognized it has an implied term in some existing 
contracts. Therefore, for German courts drittschadensliquidation arose from the parties’ 
agreement
6
.    
 
Nonetheless, later the BGH (the supreme German court) came to realize that this 
implied term approach, requiring the courts to establish that parties’ intention (or what 
would have been the parties’ intention if they had foreseen the issue) was in favor of 
drittschadensliquidation, was somewhat problematic. The BGH concluded that such 
couldn’t be easily undertaken as the ground for drittschadensliquidation, since the 
parties intention tends to be to protect themselves. The BGH concluded in 1963
7
 that 
such an approach amounted to fiction. 
 
                                                 
6 RGZ 170, 246; endorsed in BGHZ 15, 224 
7 BGHZ 40,91 
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Afterwards, the German courts adopted an objective approach under which, departing 
from the parties’ will criteria, there could be drittschadensliquidation only if: 
i) “All the damage due to the harmfull conduct of the obligor is suffered by 
the third party”; 
ii) “The claimant would have suffered [it] if the protected interest had been 
vested in him”8.  
 
The legal ground for such approach was the “special legal relations between the 
creditor under the contract and the beneficiary of the protected interest [which] cause[s] 
the interest to be „shifted‟ on to the third party, so that as a matter of law the damage is done to 
him, and not to the creditor.
9”10 
 
This approach leads to a clearer distinction between drittschadensliquidation and Verträge 
mit Schutzwirkung für Dritte (contracts with protective effects towards third parties). 
The first encompasses only the loss which was transferred, in as much as the promise 
would have suffered loss himself/herself, unless it had been transferred to the third 
party. The protected interest is the same, though it shifts from the promisee to the third 
party. On the contrary, Verträge mit Schutzwirkung für Dritte encompasses an 
enlargement of the interests contractually protected, simultaneously serving as a ground 
for promisee and third party to claim compensation. 
 
Still, taking the novel legal ground, drittschadensliquidation wasn’t contained in the 
contractual domain. German courts finally accepted that such drittschadensliquidation 
ought also be recognized in tort law. Thus, drittschadensliquidation became the 
concept/doctrine under which one might judicially claim from another (either in 
contract or in tort) the loss of a third party, provided the former could bring the claim if 
he had himself suffered the loss and provided that the loss had been transferred to the 
third party. 
 
                                                 
8 Quotations from BGHZ 40, 91, case num. 71, translated by Markesinis, B., & Unberath, H. (2002) 
9 Quotations from BGHZ 51, 91, case num 61, translated by Markesinis, B., & Unberath, H. (2002) 
10 Even such reasoning was not uniformely welcomed in following judicial decisions. See for instance BGH 
NJW 1977, 2208. 
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In parallel, the scope of the doctrine had yet to be defined. Drittschadensliquidation, as 
a judicially devised concept, was gradually (though not uniformly) applied to cases put 
forward before the courts. These cases unsurprisingly occurred more often on a set of 
cases in specific fields of law (in which either due to the nature of business practices or 
due to specific legal agreements, the transfer of loss took place more often, or even in 
which such transfer of loss appeared more often as unjust).  
 
German courts have recognized drittschadensliquidation namely in three sets of cases: 
indirect representation, transfer of risk, and taking care of another’s goods. Indirect 
representation stands for the cases in which a contract in concluded on the account of a 
third party. Transfer of risk encompasses the cases in which risk and property are not 
transferred simultaneously. Taking care of another’s goods describes cases in which one 
possesses the goods of another, looking after such goods. 
 
 
Would drittschadensliquidation be an exception only applicable in the judicially 
recognized domains or would it be a general concept? The question remains unsolved. 
 
 
 
I.4.2 – Relation between the German and English concepts 
 
The German concept of drittschadensliquidation is often quoted in the transferred loss 
debate in English law. In fact, transferred loss is conceived as resulting from the 
importation of such German concept, to the point that drittschadensliquidation is 
translated to English as transferred loss. 
 
Although these concepts are clearly close, transferred loss isn’t (or wouldn’t be) a mere 
translation or importation of a German concept. Despite the fact that English reasoning 
in this field has been enriched by the German judicial and doctrinal elaboration on the 
subject, an even if both systems arrive at similar solutions, their eventual specificities 
must not be overlooked.  
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Two reasons for such eventual specificities may be immediately perceived: Firstly, there 
is an historical acquis of English legal thinking that could not be discarded and to which 
such novel concept ought to be adapted; that is to say that transferred loss wouldn’t 
emerge in English law in a conceptual void. Secondly, we are dealing with concepts 
meant to solve what is now understood as a lacunae or as a legal injustice, but this two 
legal systems are different from one another and may not present the same challenges. 
Another unveiled reason may exist, as we shall see infra: the concept of transferred loss 
may have also roots in medieval English law. 
 
Still, considering the above mentioned reasons, understanding drittschadensliquidation 
is nonetheless essential for understanding the transferred loss debate in English law. 
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I.5 – The Privity doctrine 
 
I.5.1 – The doctrine in general 
 
The doctrine of privity of contract now stands as an essential pillar of the English law of 
contract. Privity is the doctrine by which no one may benefit from or be bound by a 
contract to which he / she is not a party to. Thus, Privity stands as the legal main ground 
for discarding (i) contractual liability outside a very strict scope inter partes and (ii) 
novel legal reasonings regarding liability – such as, contracts with protective effects 
towards third parties and transferred loss. 
 
The novel doctrines put forward in English law, namely transferred loss, attempt to 
breach the strictness imposed by a long standing understanding of privity. Though, the 
doctrine of privity has long prevailed (and still endures) in the English law of contract 
and is nowadays regarded as an essential principle of contract law, it has not always 
been so. 
 
In fact, the clear establishment of the doctrine of privity can be traced back just to the 
XIX century. And, what now may seem a revolutionary breakthrough in contract law (a 
reshaping of privity in order to accommodate third parties interests) can be found in 
case law prior to the establishment of such doctrine. So, unlike what we are led to 
believe, such novel concepts are not so unknown to contract law – instead they precede 
the clear strict establishment of privity in English law. 
 
The decisive case towards the establishment of privity was Tweddle v. Atkinson (1861). 
In such case, in consideration of an intended marriage, the father of the soon-to-be wife 
entered into a contract with the father of the soon-to-be husband, whereby each 
promised to pay the soon-to-be husband a sum of money. The soon-to-be husband, not 
having received such sum, sued his executors. Yet, the action was dismissed. 
 
Justice Wightman said:  
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“Some of the old decisions appear to support the proposition that a 
stranger to the consideration of a contract may maintain an action 
upon it, if he stands in such a near relationship to the party from whom 
the consideration proceeds, that he may be considered a party to the 
consideration … But there is no modern case in which the proposition 
has been supported. On the contrary, it is now established that no 
stranger to the consideration can take advantage of a contract, 
although made for his benefit.” (emphasis added) 
 
The doctrine of privity, as construed by the House of Lords, is a reflection of the general 
assumption that “contract, as a juristic concept, is the intimate if not the exclusive 
relationship between the parties who have made it”11. This intimateness was taken to 
such a conceptual degree that prevented third parties from judicially claiming any 
benefits from a contract, even when the parties clearly intended to confer such benefits 
upon them . This raises the issue of when should one be a considered as a party to a 
contract, which shall be dealt latter. 
 
The Law Revision Committee proposed substantial reform of the doctrine as early as 
1937, in its Sixth Interim Report
12
. Yet, only in the cases Woodar Investment 
Development Ltd v. Wimpey Construction Ltd (1980)  and Darlington Borough Council 
v. Wiltshier (1995)  opinions (though the minority) forcefully urged for privity to be 
reconsidered. In 1999 the privity doctrine was finally reshaped through the Contract 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act
13
. 
 
In the meanwhile, the High Court of Australia in the case Trident General Insurance Co 
Lts v. McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988), rejected the doctrine of privity . Followed by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in the case London Drugs Ltd v. Kuehne and Nagel 
International Ltd (1993). 
 
                                                 
11  (Cheshire, Fifoot, & Furmston, 2001, pag 573) 
12  (Committee, 1937, Cmd. 5449) 
13 Act in force at Royal Assent (11.11.1999) 
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I.5.2 – Reasons for the doctrine 
 
There has been a vast debate over the grounds on which the doctrine of privity is based. 
On the one hand, it is clear that no one except a party can be subjected to liabilities 
under it, as otherwise contractual obligations would be imposed without one’s consent, 
unduly restraining one’s contractual freedom. On the other hand, it is not so clear why 
no one except a party to a contract can acquire rights under it. 
 
Steyn LJ has expressed that there is no “doctrinal, logical or policy reason”14 justifying 
it. Furthermore, according to Treitel’s Law of Contract: 
“The rule that a third party cannot acquire rights under a contract can scarcely 
be justified by saying that a contract is, or gives rise, to a personal relationship, 
affecting only the parties to it; for this is rather a restatement of the rule than a 
reason for its existence” 15. 
 
With all due respect, the personal relationship is first and foremost a matter of fact: the 
contract is concluded between the parties. In addition, as recognized in Treitel’s Law of 
Contract, by recognizing third parties rights in contract, the contract is no longer limited 
to the parties. In light of third party rights it would be hard to conceive that the parties 
alone could still amend or cancel a contract, altering or voiding another one’s right. Yet, 
from another point of view, each party as dominus of the contract should master the 
rights and obligations therein through agreement with his/her counter-parties. 
 
In parallel to this debate, it should be noted that the English system does not give the 
right to enforce a gratuitous promise (in light of consideration), third parties may be 
comparable to gratuitous promisees. 
 
In the end, despite the several studies on the scope and effects of privity, English law 
lacks an in-depth analysis on the rational that underlies such doctrine. 
 
                                                 
14 (Darlington Borough Council v. Wiltshier, 1995) 
15 (Peel, 2007, p. 622) 
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I.5.3 - Qualifications to the doctrine 
 
Qualifications to the doctrine of privity can be traced back to the eighteenth century, 
when privity itself wasn’t clearly established. As such, modern law empowers to a 
certain extent ancient legal regimes that predate the establishment of privity and are 
now regarded as qualifications to such doctrine. 
 
a) The agency reasoning 
 
The doctrine of the undisclosed principle is one of the qualifications to the privity 
doctrine and has been questioned for being contrary to its principles
16
. In a contract 
made by two parties, a third party may intervene in lieu of one the parties provided 
he/she can establish the party was acting as his or hers agent. 
 
Agency is the relationship through which one acts as the representative of another. As 
such, 
“The essential characteristic of an agent is that is invested with a legal power to 
alter his principal‟s legal relations with third parties; the principal is under a 
correlative liability to have his legal relations altered”17 
   
The aforementioned legal power can result from express appointment, estoppel, 
ratification, necessity or can be presumed in the case of cohabitation. The underlining 
agency contract is one of the special contracts of English law.  
 
Whenever an agent performs a contract with another party under agency, privity is 
established between the agent’s principal and the other party. In those circumstances, 
the contract is enforceable by the principle (and exceptionally also by the agent when so 
provided). All this derives from the fact that the agent acts in representation of the 
principal. Often difficulties arise in establishing whether someone acted as an agent 
(agency doesn’t require to be expressly invoked) or as an independent contractor. Such 
                                                 
16 Lectures in Legal History 
17 Dowrick 17 MLR. Reynolds 94LQR 225 
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difficulties are most common when someone acts as an intermediary: the intermediary 
can perform a contract as an agent, but can also perform independent contracts. 
 
The issue of undisclosed principle is raised when the other party in unaware that the 
contract was concluded with someone’s agent. It has long been established that in such 
case the contract in enforceable either by or against both the agent and the principal 
(Sims v Bond [1833] and Saxon v Blake [1861]) 
 
b) The law of property in general 
 
Difficulties in bringing together the doctrine of privity with the needs and concepts of 
the law of property also predate even the clear establishment of the former. In fact, by 
the XVI century it had been recognized that there were contracts that create rights of 
property that cannot be kept within contractual bonds (leases for instance)
18
. No doubt 
that in such cases there is privity between the parties themselves, but if either transfers 
his interest to a stranger then the benefits and burdens ought to be equally transferred. 
 
Modern case law acknowledged such qualification most notably in Smith and Snipes 
Hall Farm Ltd v River Douglas Catchment Board [1949]. In such case, the owners of 
land had commissioned improvements in the land and their maintenance for all times of 
the work when completed. In 1940 one of the land owners sold her land to a third party, 
later the third party leased the land to another. Could the new land owner and the third 
party which had leased the land enforce the contract? The Court of Appeal answered in 
the affirmative, though both plaintiffs were strangers to the contract. The ground for 
such decision was the fact that the contract was intended to benefit anyone to whom the 
land might be transferred and to whom the defendants were liable. 
 
c) The law of property act 
 
The Law of Property Act 1925 provides under Section 56(1) that: 
                                                 
18 Spencer’s case (1583) 
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“A person may take an immediate or other interest in land or other property, or 
the benefit of any condition, right of entry, covenant or agreement over or 
respecting land or other property, although he may not be named as a party to 
the conveyance or other instrument.” 
 
And, under Section 205(1):  
“‟Property‟ includes any thing in action, and any interest in real or personal 
property” 
 
According to various Lord Denning’s obiter dictums19, the above quoted section of the 
Law of Property Act abrogated the doctrine of privity in the case of contracts related to 
property (property under section 205(1) of the aforementioned). Lord Denning’s 
interpretation was repealed by the House of Lords in Beswick v Beswick [1968]. 
 
Peter Beswick sold his business to his nephew in consideration that he would pay him 
£6,10 per week and after his death he would pay his widow £5 per week. After Peter 
Beswick’s death his nephew refused to pay Peter’s widow. She sued him both as 
administratrix of Peter’s estate and in her personal capacity. The Court of Appeal 
unanimously recognized her locus standi as administratrix, while only Lord Denning 
and Lord Justice Danckwerts were in favor of recognizing her locus standi additionally 
in her personal capacity under Section 56(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925. 
 
The Defendant appealed to the House of Lords, which up hold that the widow only had 
locus standi as administratrix. The House of Lords decided so, despite admitting that the 
language of Section 56(1) was broad enough for it to be construed in order to support 
the conclusions of Lord Denning and Lord Justice Danckwerts. This was so because 
their lordships considered that in an act devoted to real property the parliament didn’t 
intend to inadvertedly revolutionize the law of contract. As such, the purpose of the 
Law of Property Act 1925 was merely to consolidate the enactments relating to 
conveyancing and the law of property in England and Wales
20
. 
                                                 
19  (Cheshire, Fifoot, & Furmston, 2001, pag 507, note 20) 
20  (Treitel, 2003, pag 30)  (Cheshire, Fifoot, & Furmston, 2001, pag 507) 
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d) Doctrine of constructive trust 
 
Qualifications on the privity doctrine were more reluctantly accepted in common law 
outside the fields of property and commercial law. Yet, a possible answer had been 
found in equity by the eighteenth century. In Tomlinson v Gill [1756], Lord Hardwicke 
facing a case in which A promised B to pay a sum of money to C, found - as obiter 
dictum - that it would be possible to regard B as a trustee for C of the benefit of the 
contract. Only by 1817 a case was decided taking such constructive trust as ratio 
decidendi: Gregory and Parker v Williams [1817].  
 
Taking into account that the doctrine of constructive trust was developed within equity, 
one must seek how it was observed following the Judicature Act 1873
21
. In Lloyd‟s v 
Harper [1880], Lush LJ referred: 
 
“I consider it to be an established rule of law that where a contract is made with 
A for the benefit of B, A can sue on the contract for the benefit of B and recover 
all that B could have recovered if the contract had been made with B himself.”  
 
Though this could erroneously be interpreted as simply putting forward the doctrine of 
privity, it is cited by Lord Birkenhead in Les Affréteurs Réunis v Walford [1919] as 
admitting this doctrine of constructive trust. It should be noted that the doctrine of 
constructive trust wasn’t even taken into consideration inbetween those two cases in 
Dunlop v Selfridge [1915], while the facts could call upon constructive trust. 
 
The case law that followed, though not repealing the doctrine of constructive trust, 
reveals judicial reluctance in recognizing the existence of trusts in such circumstances. 
According to Du Parq LJ in Re Schebsman, Official Receiver v Cargo Superintendents 
(London) Ltd and Schebsman [1944], there isn’t any trust “unless an intention to create 
a trust is clearly to be collected from the language used and the circumstances of the 
case”. Or, as additionally explained by Romer LJ in Green v Russell [1959], “[a]n 
                                                 
21The debate over the substantive effects (if any) of the Judicature Act 1873 is to be found outside the scope 
of this paper.  (Webb & Akkouh, 2008, pag 9)  (Birks, 1996)  (Burrows, 2002)   
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intention to provide benefits for someone else and to pay for them does not in itself give 
rise to a trusteeship”.  
 
Thus, over time law as evolved and the scope of the constructive trust’s doctrine has 
been fairly restricted to cases in which the parties specifically intended to create a trust. 
Therefore, the ground on which Gregory and Parker v Williams was decided back in 
1817 is no longer valid in English law, as when someone enters into a contract for the 
benefit of another it no longer amounts to a constructive trust. 
  
I.5.4 – The Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Acts 
 
The Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, legally empowering the views 
expressed the 1996 Law Commission Report
22
 
23
, confers rights on third parties which 
have the nature of a statutory exception. 
 
The initial proposal for reform put forward by the Law Commission was enacted as 
statutory law (with minor refinements), without having been substantially further 
enhanced. This means that the re-shaping of the privity doctrine was rather limited and - 
as result of that – instead of a substantial reform of the general rule, the aforementioned 
statutory exception emerged.  
 
As Treitel
24
 points out, the The Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act’s effects are 
mainly limited in two ways: 
 
a) Several transferred loss cases are outside the scope of the statutory exception to 
the privity doctrine; 
b)  The statutory exception is itself subject to several exceptions. 
 
In the end, as the Commission acknowledged: 
                                                 
22 (Law Commission Report N.º 242 (1996)) 
23 Preceded by the 6th Interim Report of the Law Revision Committee (1937) 
24  (Peel, 2007, pag 615) 
C A T Ó L I C A  G L O B A L  S C H O O L  O F  L A W  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
27 
 
“it is important to emphasise that, while our proposed reform will give some 
third parties the right to enforce contracts, there will remain many contracts 
where a third party stands to benefit and yet will not have a right of 
enforceability. Our proposed statute carves out a general and wide-ranging 
exception to the third party rule, but it leaves the rule intact for cases not 
covered by the statute”. 
 
In the end, the act acknowledges a strictly defined recognition of contracts with for the 
benefit of third parties, excluding cases in which third parties are affected without being 
owned a contractual obligation
25
. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
25 For more on The Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, see chapters II.2.2 and II.2.3 
  
C A T Ó L I C A  G L O B A L  S C H O O L  O F  L A W  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part II - Alternatives to Transferred Loss 
 
C A T Ó L I C A  G L O B A L  S C H O O L  O F  L A W  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
29 
  
C A T Ó L I C A  G L O B A L  S C H O O L  O F  L A W  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
30 
II.1 – Tort claims 
 
 
According to Street, “[l]aw of Tort defines the obligations imposed on one member of 
society to his or her fellows and provides compensation and other remedies for harms 
caused by breach of such obligations” (Murhpy, Brazier, & Street, 2003). Under 
English Law, there is a closed system of nominate torts – in contrast with the general 
clauses of some continental systems. As such, there is a set of torts.  
 
First and foremost, regarding this field of English Law and the definition put forward by 
Street, one might question: are we dealing with a Law of Tort or a Law of Torts? This 
apparently irrelevant question steams from an essential theoretical question: is there a 
common core that unites the different torts under a single institute? 
 
Underpinning such definition there is a distinction between, on the one hand tort law 
and criminal law, and, on the other hand, tort law and contract law. The distinction 
between Tort, Criminal and Contract Law can be drawn from several viewpoints and 
encompasses the differences regarding who owes the obligation, to whom the obligation 
is owed, the nature of the obligation, the reactions prescribed by law to its breaches and 
the functions it serves. 
 
There is no clear-cut disjunctive distinction between the operative fields of each type of 
responsibility. In many circumstances, the same facts may accommodate various types 
of liability. A crime or a tort can be committed through a contract or through the same 
facts that constitute its breach. On some cases this leads to an overlap of responsibility 
of different types. This leads to an array of issues, namely, which, if any, takes 
precedence over the others and to what extent may reparation may claimed under which 
in such case. On others, one type of responsibility may complement the shortcomings of 
another. The  purpose of this section to explore to what extent may tort law provide an 
answer to the contract law short comings regarding transferred loss. 
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As just mentioned, under English law, each tort has its own scope and conditions. 
Therefore, a separate inquiry must me developed regarding each tort that may be 
relevant to the issue. For the sake of clarity and synthesis our analysis shall be limited to 
the broadest tort available in English law: negligence. 
 
II.1.1 – General overview of the tort of Negligence 
 
The tort of negligence occupies a central position in the English law of torts. Gradual 
recognition that, in some cases, compensation should be awarded for damages caused 
by carelessness led to the development of the tort of negligence. Yet, negligence didn’t 
emerge as a separate tort until the XIX century and was only clearly defined by a XX 
century leading case.  Three XIX century cases emerge as foundational cases in such 
process: Vaughan v Menlove (1837), Winterbottom v Wright (1842) and Heaven v 
Pender (1883).  
 
In the first of the aforementioned, Vaughan v Menlove, the reasonable person test was 
put forward, establishing what would be a feature of the tort of negligence: 
 
“[W]hether the Defendant had acted honestly and bona fide to the best of his 
own judgment (...) would leave so vague a line as to afford no rule at all (...) 
[Since the judgment of the individual is] as variable as the length of the foot of 
each (...) we ought rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a 
regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe.” 
(Emphasis added). 
 
Once having defined the view point from which diligence ought to be evaluated, the 
scope of duties (to which such test was to be applied) was sill uncertain. So, in 
Winterbottom v Wright, the plaintiff sought recovery as a third party, based on the 
breach of a defendant’s duty under a contract. The Court decided that the right to 
recover for a breach of contract is confined to those who enter into such contract, under 
privity. Later, in Heaven v Pender, Brett MR recognized that individuals may claim the 
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existence of a duty of care (it may be added: despite being third parties to contracts and 
irrespective of such contracts): 
 
“[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with 
regard to another that everyone of ordinary sense who did think would at once 
recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with 
regard to those circumstances he would cause danger or injury to the person 
or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid 
such danger”. Brett MR Speech obiter dictum (Emphasis added) 
 
The answer given in Heaven v Pender developed into the “neighboring principle” as set 
forward by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932]: 
 
“There must be, and is, some general conception of relations giving rise to a 
duty of care, of which the particular cases found in the books are but instances. 
(…) The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law you must not 
injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question: Who is my neighbour? 
receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or 
omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your 
neighbour. Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be - 
persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought 
reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am 
directing my mind to the acts or omissions that are called in question . . . a 
manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as to show that he 
intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him 
with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with knowledge 
that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of products 
will result in an injury to the consumer's life or property, owes a duty to the 
consumer to take that reasonable care.” Lord Atkin speech (Emphasis added) 
 
The above quoted was paramount in the establishing in English Law the tortious 
principle of a general duty of care. The reasoning supporting such principle derives not 
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only from Heaven v Pender but more importantly from US case law - most notably 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. [1916].  
 
The neighboring principle has its roots in the Christian principle of loving your 
neighbor, as prescribed in James 2:8 (“If ye fulfil the royal law according to the 
scripture, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, ye do well”) and Leviticus chapter 
19 ("love one's neighbor as oneself"). 
 
It should be noted however that – despite being a landmark – such reasoning by Lord 
Atkin constituted merely obiter dictum and according to Street “it is probable that Lord 
Atkin never intended it to be an exact comprehensive statement of law”26. The ratio 
decidendi of the case is somewhat more limited by focusing on the recognition of a duty 
from the manufacturer of goods to the eventual users of those goods. What is certain, 
however, is that it demonstrated that the tort of negligence was capable of further 
expansion. As Lord Macmillan aptly put it “categories of negligence are never closed”, 
that is, courts are to recognize the existence of duties even when no precedent 
establishes such duty. 
 
Therefore, three notes should be taken: i) the nineteenth century and initial twentieth 
century development of the tort of negligence lead to the development of a general duty 
of care in England and in the US; ii) both achieved a certain judicial recognition, though 
no precedent could be said to exist in English law; iii) there was a clear gradual 
broadening of the tort of negligence. 
 
Yet, the broadening of the tort of negligence wasn’t a continuous uniform process. In 
fact, on other cases the courts refused to acknowledge duties on which the tort of 
negligence could be based (or the existence of a general duty applicable to the case). For 
instance, Langbrook Properties Lta v Surrey County [1969] and Midland Bank v 
Bargrove Property Services [1991] could be quoted. 
 
                                                 
26  (Murhpy, Brazier, & Street, 2003, pag 178) (Haseldine v CA Daw & Son Ltd, 1941) 
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Still, by 1970 the courts embraced the aforementioned Lord Atkin’s obiter dictum. In 
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970], Lord Reid stated: 
  
“The time has come when we can and should say that it [Lord Atkin‟s neighbour 
principle] ought to apply unless there is some justification or valid explanation 
for its exclusion”. 
 
The rule as such was best synthesized in Anns v Merton London Borough Council 
(1978) by Lord Wilberforce: 
 
“[T]he position has now been reached that in order to establish that a duty of 
care arises in a particular situation, it is not necessary to bring the facts of that 
situation within those of previous situations in which a duty of care has been 
held to exist. Rather the question has been approached in two stages. First, one 
has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who 
suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or 
neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, 
carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the latter, in which 
case a prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered 
affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether there are any considerations 
which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty of the class 
of person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it may give 
rise”. Emphasis added. 
 
The expansionary progression of the scope of the duty(ies) of care was reversed by 
1985, most notably after the Governors of the Peabody Donation Fund v Sir Lindsay 
Parkinson & Co Ltd [1985] case. In this case the Court, through the speech of Lord 
Keith, regarding the broadening of the duties under the tort of negligence, stated “It is 
material to take into consideration whether it is just and reasonable that it should be 
so”.  
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As such, initially a duty was said to exist whenever there was a relationship of 
proximity or neighbourhood (derived from the reasonable contemplation from one that 
his careness would cause loss to the other.) Afterwards, a two stage test was developed: 
firstly one should assert there is proximity, secondly when there is proximity a 
presumption is raised for the existence of the corresponding duty (and may be rebutted 
provided that there is a valid justification, namely of public policy). The 1985 decision 
established the opposite rule: a duty doesn’t exist, unless there is a valid justification. 
One may say that the presumption was reversed. 
 
Ultimately, in Stovin v Wise [1996]
27
, the Court through Lord Hoffmann’s speech 
considers: 
  
“The trend of authorities has been to discourage the assumption that anyone 
who suffers loss is prima facie entitled to compensation from a person 
(preferably insured or a public authority) whose act or omission can be said to 
have caused it. The default position is that he is not.” 
 
In as so much, the tort of negligence has evolved through a number of periods: the 
establishment of a tort of negligence, the establishment of a duty of care and the 
containment of the duty of care. 
 
II.1.2 – Towards neminem laedere ? 
 
The tort of negligence has been broadened to such an extent that the question “Has 
English Law Become more French than French?” – posed by Malcom Clark – could be 
imported into this domain. In fact, one may question: Does the tort of negligence 
represent a step closer to the neminem laedere principle (which inspired the French 
general liability clause under article 1382 of the Civil Code)? 
 
 
                                                 
27 See also Murphy v Brentwood District Council (1991), which expressly considered Anns v Merton 
London Borough Council not in accordance with the Law. 
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This even closer relationship between the different liability systems is best described by 
Sacco (Piezzorusso & alli, 1992) in an anecdotal style: 
 
“[For the Frenchman] compensation is certainly due, because every act 
whatever of man which causes damage to others imposes an obligation for 
compensation on the person because of whom the damage has been caused.” 
“The German does not agree. It is not possible that every culpable act should 
bind you legally. The obligation arises from the culpable, illegal injury of the 
absolute right of the victim. (…)” 
“The Englishman does not understand this doctrine of absolute rights. 
Responsibility operates when you commit one of the specific wrongs laid down 
by law (…)”. 
“[In the end,] the empirical solutions are largely uniform. The French judge, 
when condemning takes inspiration from tout fait quelconque and when 
absolving resorts to the doctrine of les causes de justification. The German 
judge, when condemning, always finds a paragraph in the code that legalizes the 
sanction, and when absolving recalls without any problem the lawfulness of acts 
not prohibited. In England ever wider applications of the tort of negligence 
allow to neutralize the typicalness of actions based on responsibility ex 
delicto.” (Emphasis added) 
 
 
II.1.3 – Have intentional torts become obsolete? 
 
The vast majority of the judicial decisions under English law awarding damages are 
based on the Tort of Negligence. This may lead to the aforesaid question: “have 
intentional torts become obsolete?” The question derives from the broadening of the 
Tort of Negligence.  
 
If the Tort of Negligence were to become the English equivalent to the neminem laedere 
principle (as addressed supra), then such tort would encompass the actions causing 
damages in general. In such case, actions causing damages in general would fall within 
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the scope of negligence and some would also – at the same time - fall within the scope 
of other specific torts (namely the intentional torts). Under those circumstances, the tort 
of negligence would prevail and render all others obsolete in as much as it would be 
easier to claim compensation under negligence. 
 
First and foremost, the tort of negligence did not become the English equivalent to the 
neminem laedere principle. Two main aspects apparently restrain negligence from 
becoming so: i) the concept of proximity; ii) the need for justification in terms of public 
policy. Yet, the main reason for not becoming so is the judges’ will, as expressed in 
Stovin v Wise [1996] (quoted above). In fact, both proximity and public policy are grey 
areas, undetermined concepts, which need to be fulfilled through judicial interpretation. 
This means that proximity and public policy could be interpreted as to generate a 
neminem laedere principle, but they are not. In particular a judge, when determining 
what public policy is (or should be), can argue that the adequate public policy is 
neminem laedere or can argue the opposite. In the end, judges are making the law along 
the way and are making public policy themselves (rather then interpreting or applying a 
public policy set forward through the political institutions). 
 
Secondly, it must be strengthened that plaintiffs have more often invoked negligence 
since on intentional torts an additional element must be proven: intention. The 
importance of intention in the so-called intentional torts (contrary to what may seem) is 
a somewhat recent evolution of the law. As Street aptly states: “Early common layers 
were not especially interested in the mental state of the defendant. They were satisfied 
to ask whether the defendant had directly inflicted on the claimant the harm complained 
of.” This understanding of early common lawyers was most notably repelled in Fowler 
v Lanning [1959] (clarified by Letang v Cooper [1965]). Still, it was not without 
difficulty that such concept of “intention” was developed. On the one hand it was clear 
that when the defendant had wished to inflict the damage upon the plaintiff we were 
within the scope of “intention”. And it was equally clear that purely involuntary acts 
were outside its scope. While, on the other hand, the issue of voluntary acts with 
unwanted results wasn’t of simple answer. 
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Thirdly, while the torts of negligence evolved into a unified tort of negligence, the 
intentional torts remained distinct, with separate scopes and without systematically 
covering the field of intentionally caused damages.  
 
Fourthly, the way English tort law evolved lead to a paradox: intentionally caused 
damages may be within the scope of the tort of negligence. An intentional action can be 
under the proximity and public policy restraints of negligence. And, it should be noted 
that while intentional torts require intention, the tort of negligence doesn’t require 
negligence itself – an intentional act can be found to be within its scope. In fact, the tort 
of negligence started has a residual category and it is now the most used tort. In 
extremis, an intentional action can be within the scope of the tort of negligence but do 
not correspond to any of the set intentional torts. 
 
Fifth, the statistical data stating that most tort law actions are based on the tort of 
negligence can be explained by one last feature. The fact that the law regarding the tort 
of negligence is far more unclear than the law regarding intentional torts may also cause 
greater litigation regarding the former. Such statistical data shows which cases appear 
more before the courts, but doesn’t tell us which ones enable more damages recovery in 
every day life. 
 
 
II.1.4 – Pure economic loss in the Tort of Negligence 
 
The distinctive character of pure economic loss, even within the realm of the tort of 
negligence has been pointed out – creating a special legal regime. The distinction was 
most notably stated by Lord Bridge in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990]: 
  
“One of the most important distinctions always to be observed lies in the law‟s 
essentially different approach to the different kinds of damage which one party 
may have suffered in consequence of the acts or omissions of another. It is one 
thing to owe a duty to avoid causing injury to the person or property of others. It 
is quite another to avoid causing others to suffer purely economic loss.” 
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The issue raised is: when is there a duty to safeguard against pure economic loss? The 
restrictiveness courts imposed on the tort of negligence is of particular importance in 
this field. By 1985, Lord Fraser stated in The Mineral Transporter case that “some limit 
or control mechanism has to be imposed on the liability of a wrongdoer towards those 
who have suffered economic damage as a consequence of his negligence”. 
 
The most notable decision in respect for pure economic loss was rendered as early as 
1964. In Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964], Lord Morris of Borth-
Y-Gest holds that: 
 
“I consider that it follows and that it should now be regarded as settled that if 
someone possessed of a special skill undertakes, quite irrespective of contract, 
to apply that skill for the assistance of another person who relies upon such 
skill, a duty of care will arise. The fact that the service is to be given by means 
of or by the instrumentality of words can make no difference. Furthermore, if in 
a sphere in which a person is so placed that others could reasonably rely upon 
his judgment or his skill or upon his ability to make careful inquiry, a person 
takes it upon himself to give information or advice to, or allows his information 
or advice to be passed on to, another person who, as he knows or should know, 
will place reliance upon it, then a duty of care will arise.” (Emphasis added) 
 
As is clear from the above quoted speech by Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest, in that case 
the court not just recognized the duty to avoid careless statements by those who posses 
special skills and apply such skills by given statements to assist others – that is to say, 
the court not just recognized a duty of care in issuing professional opinions. Indeed, the 
court acknowledged a broad duty of care in special skill undertakings in relation to 
those in whose assistance the undertaking was conducted and whom relied on such 
undertaking – that is to say, the court acknowledged a broad duty of care in professional 
activities for those at whom they were directed. 
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Following Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] the way for 
extending the tort of negligence to pure economic loss had been paved as above 
mentioned. Still, such extension only received subsequent judicial recognition in White 
v Jones [1995] – which became the milestone of the extension of the so called Hedley 
Byrne principle, more than 30 years after the Hedley Byrne case itself. 
 
White v Jones has the following factual background: Mr White asked Mr Jones (a 
solicitor) to draft his will. When he initially did so, Mr White and his daughters were 
upset with each other. As a result, Mr White asked Mr Jones to cut them out of the will. 
Before Mr White’s death, he and his daughters resolved the pending issues between. 
Subsequently, Mr White asked Mr Jones to reinstate them in his will, awarding tem 
£9000. Until his death, Mr Jones didn’t follow Mr White’s last instruction.  
 
Could the daughters recover from Mr Jones?  
 
Several issues could be raised. First of all, in relation to pure economic loss, one may 
ask: was there any loss? Is it really a loss? Can someone lose something even before 
acquiring it? The answer relies in contemplating what was lost. The £9000 weren’t 
theirs, so they couldn’t be lost. Yet, there was an expectation to acquire the £9000 and 
the loss is the non-fulfillment of such expectation. 
 
This leads us to the second question: Should every expectation be protected under the 
law, namely under tortious law? The answer is in the negative, otherwise there would be 
liability towards an indefinite number of people, for an indefinite type of actions, 
amounting to an indefinite compensation. On the one hand, there are cases in which 
simple expectations shouldn’t be protected; on the other hand, there are cases in which 
it would be extremely unjust not to protect. In this case, Lord Goff refers to the 
“impulse to do practical justice”. Yet, “justice” as a subjective concept would hardly 
become a reliable legal criterion. Thus, according to Lord Goff, “there is a lacuna in the 
law, in the sense that practical justice requires that the disappointed beneficiary should 
have a remedy against the testator‟s solicitor in circumstances in which neither the 
testator nor his estate has in law suffered a loss”. 
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Lorenz, referring to similar factual circumstances, considered “this is a situation which 
comes very close to the cases of „transferred loss‟, the only difference being that the 
damage due to the solicitor‟s negligence could never have been caused to the testator 
or to his executor”28 (Professor Lorenz in Essays in Memory of Professor F H Lawson p 
90). 
 
The solution adopted rests in Lord Goff’s speech: 
 
“In my opinion, therefore, your Lordships‟ House should in cases such as these 
extend to the intended beneficiary a remedy under the Hedley Byrne principle by 
holding that the assumption of responsibility by the solicitor towards his client 
should be held in law to extend to the intended beneficiary who (as the solicitor 
can reasonably foresee) may, as a result of the solicitor‟s negligence, be 
deprived of his intended legacy in circumstances in which neither the testator 
nor his estate will have a remedy against the solicitor.” 
 
Several teachings can be extracted from White v Jones, namely:  
 
a) the existence of a contract on the matter (between the defendant and a 
third party – the testator) didn’t prevent the applicability of tort law 
remedies; that is, the privity of contract doesn’t exclude tortious liability;  
 
b) a duty in tort can arise (irrespectively of contract) when there is a 
special relationship between the parties;  
 
c) a special relationship, within this context, arises when the defendant 
assumes responsibility for performing a particular task knowing and 
accepting others’ economic welfare depends on the careful execution of 
the task
29
 
 
                                                 
28  (Merkin & alli, 1986, pag 90) 
29 It should be noted that reliance is not an essential condition for a relationship to arise. 
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The extension of the Hedley Byrne principle was latter consolidated in Williams v 
Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998]. Lord Steyn in his speech (unanimously uphold) 
synthesized the law as follows: 
 
“The extended Hedley Byrne principle is the rationalisation or technique 
adopted by English law to provide a remedy for the recovery of damages in 
respect of economic loss caused by the negligent performance of services. 
Secondly, it was established that once a case is identified as falling within the 
extended Hedley Byrne principle, there is no need to embark on any further 
inquiry whether it is "fair, just and reasonable" to impose liability for economic 
loss. Thirdly, and applying Hedley Byrne, it was made clear that "reliance upon 
[the assumption of responsibility] by the other party will be necessary to 
establish a cause of action (because otherwise the negligence will have no 
causative effect)." Fourthly, it was held that the existence of a contractual duty 
of care between the parties does not preclude the concurrence of a tort duty in 
the same respect.” 
 
The somewhat complementary role of the tort of negligence, expanding to overcome the 
shortcomings of contract law and of other specific torts, was to become even clearer in 
Kapfunde v Abbey National plc [1999]. In this case, an employee made an inaccurate 
reference in relation to his employer, which caused the latter damages. Though the tort 
of defamation is clearly established, it requires malice to be proven – which is 
extremely difficult. As such, redress was obtained through the tort of negligence, most 
notably the Hedley Byrne principle. 
 
Still, the Hedley Byrne principle - through its formulation - leaved outside its scope 
many cases of economic loss. To a great extent, it is a matter of public policy to define 
how far should recovery be allowed. With the Hedley Byrne principle the possibility to 
recover damages was extended when there was a special relationship and within a strict 
causality link. Was this enough to address adequately the economic loss issue under the 
tort of negligence? 
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Apart from Hedley Byrne, the House of Lords was called adjudge the applicability of 
the Anns v Merton London Borough Council doctrine (the duty of care test refered 
supra) to cases of pure economic loss. Most notably, in Murphy v Brentwood District 
Council (1991), Lord Keith of Kinkel considered: 
 
“It being recognised that the nature of the loss held to be recoverable in Anns 
was pure economic loss, the next point for examination is whether the avoidance 
of loss of that nature fell within the scope of any duty of care owed to the 
plaintiffs by the local authority. On the basis of the law as it stood at the time of 
the decision the answer to that question must be in the negative. The right to 
recover for pure economic loss, not flowing from physical injury, did not then 
extend beyond the situation where the Joss had been sustained through reliance 
on negligent mis-statements, as in Hedley Byrne.” 
 
Whether Anns v Merton London Borough Council was or not a pure economic loss is a 
complex debate, though it is clear that it no longer remains the standart for establishing 
the existence of a duty of care both for physical and pure economic loss. In addition, the 
proximity requirement is judicially interpreted far more strictly in cases of pure 
economic loss. The above quoted Lord Keith’s speech limits proximity in cases of pure 
economic loss to the Hedley Byrne principle. 
 
Lord Keith’s view excessive strictness is correct by Lord … speech in the same case. 
Lord – although generally concurring Lord Keith’s speech considers: 
 
“There may, of course, be situations where, even in the absence of contract, 
there is a special relationship of proximity (…) which is sufficiently akin to 
contract to introduce the element of reliance so that the scope of the duty of care 
(…) is wide enough to embrace purely economic loss. The decision in Junior 
Books Ltd v. Veitchi Co. Ltd. [1983] 1 A.C. 520 can, I believe, only be 
understood on this basis.” 
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II.1.5 – Tort of Negligence: an answer to transferred loss? 
 
Despite the major steps that English courts have taken to encompass pure economic 
loss, the tort of negligence’s scope is still unclear30. No specific rules have been 
recognized in Tort Law regarding transferred loss. 
 
Yet, specific transferred loss cases may eventually be adressed under the tort of 
negligence within the liability for negligent misstatements
31
, the liability for negligent 
performance of a service
32
, the liability for negligence in case of defects in buildings 
and products
33
 and liability for relational economic loss arising from damage to a third 
party’s property34 . 
 
In Markesinis and Deakins Tort Law
35
 it is stated that the Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999 and the Panatown
36
 case may cause a further reshapment of tort law. 
Such reshapment could provide new answers in the field of transferred loss. Tort and 
Contract law are two complementary system, so changes in one may be followed by 
changes in the other. Deakin, Johnson, & Markesinis in expecting Panatown to produce 
changes in Tort law are expecting transferred loss to be also equated in Tort law, as 
happened in Germany37. 
 
  
                                                 
30  (Deakin, Johnson, & Markesinis, 2008, pags 157-198) 
31  (Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd, 1964) 
32  (Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd, 1994) 
33  (Murphy v Brentwood District Council, 1991) 
34  (Leigh and Sillavan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd , 1986)  (Owners of cargo lately laden on board the 
ship or vessel "Starsin" and others v. Owners and/or demise charterers of the ship or vessel "Starsin", 2003) 
35  (Deakin, Johnson, & Markesinis, 2008, pag 198) 
36  (Alfred McAlpine Construction Lta v Panatown Ltd, 1998) 
37 See chapter I.4 
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II.2 – Third party’s contract claims 
II.2.1 – The types of third party’s contract claims 
 
Third party’s contract claims could represent a solution to the transferred loss problem, 
provided that the cases in which such problem arises could be within the scope of 
admissible third party’s contract claims. Under this heading, two types of third party’s 
contract claims will be considered: the contract for the benefit of a third party and the 
contract with protective effects towards third parties. 
 
The contract for the benefit of a third party is one by which the contractors create a 
primary obligation owed to a third party; while contract with protective effect is one by 
which the contractors create a secondary obligation owed to a third party. In the former, 
the third party is the recipient of the obligation owed. In the latter, the third party is the 
recipient of protective duties, becoming part of the relationship without being owed any 
primary obligation, but being able to rely on its adequate performance. 
 
 
II.2.2 – The contract for the benefit of a third party 
 
The concept of contract for the benefit of a third party was long debated both in civil 
and common law jurisdictions. In civil law the contract for the benefit of a third party 
was largely implemented in the XIX century codification. While in English law the 
contract for the benefit of a third party only definitely emerged through the Contract 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act of 1999. 
 
As mentioned supra, the late acceptance of the contract for the benefit of a third party in 
English law as due to the rigid interpretation of the privity doctrine, while civil law 
departed earlier from the Roman law principle res inter alios acta nec nocet nec prodest 
(a matter between others does not arm nor benefit) - since a matter between others may 
now benefit provided certain conditions are met. 
Still, as addressed supra in relation to the qualifications to the doctrine of privity, 
several legal constructions over time have been tried to overcome the rigid 
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interpretation of the privity doctrine. For their importance, the agency reasoning, the 
constructive tort and section 56(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 must once again be 
mentioned. 
 
Nowadays in English law, the conditions for third party claims in contract are 
established under section 1 of the Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act: i) the contract 
expressly provides that the third party may enforce a term of the contract; or ii) the term 
purports to confer a benefit to the third party, unless if on a proper construction of the 
contract it appears that the parties did not intend the term to be enforceable by the third 
party. 
 
As such, when the terms of a contract don’t expressly provide their enforceability by a 
third party, the enforceability test under section 1, designed by the Law Commission, 
provides that: i) when it is shown that the contract “purports to confer a benefit” a 
presumption of third party enforceability is raised; ii) such presumption may be rebutted 
taking into account the apparent intention of the parties on a proper construction of the 
contract. Still, according to the Law Comission, “express designation by name, class or 
description is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for raising the rebuttable 
presumption”38 39. 
 
Hence, many cases which would fall into the category of transferred loss are excluded 
from the scope of the Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act. In addition, paragraph 6 
provides that contracts from a number of fields are excluded from the scope of section 
1, namely those related to promissory notes, employment and goods’ carriage. 
 
In the cases emerging within the scope of the Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 
there is now legal ground to prevent the situation in which the person who had suffered 
the loss could not sue, while the person who had suffered no loss could sue. Yet, 
                                                 
38 (Law Commission Report N.º 242 (1996), para. 7.18) 
39 The Law Comission’s reports relevance in interpreting statutory law as been recognised in Pepper v Hart 
[1993] 
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transferred loss doesn’t only emerge when the parties intend to confer a benefit to a 
third party and most certainly doesn’t only emerge within the enforceability test. 
 
II.2.3 – The contract with protective effects towards third parties 
 
The acceptance of the contract with protective effects towards third parties would 
represent an alternative for recovery. In relation to such contracts three main issues 
should be taken into consideration: i) the concept of such contracts; ii) the scope of 
contracts with protective effects towards third parties is much broader than that of 
transferred loss; iii) the restrictive approach to contracts for the benefit of a third party 
has deep impacts in the admissibility of contracts with protective effects towards third 
parties. 
 
The concept of contract with protective effects towards third parties has its roots in a 
BGH (German Supreme Court) decision of April 25th, 1956. In such case, a machine 
was sold to a factory. Such machine was dangerous and one of the factory employees 
was injured. Such employee directly sued the machine manufacturer. The Court 
considered that when selling such machine the parties were aware that the machine was 
going to be used by third parties and extended the benefit of the contractual protective 
duties to them. Larenz considers this to have been a major step in the fields of protective 
duties and good-faith
40
. According to Kannowski, German case law has been 
inconsistent by deriving such protective effects either from an objective duty of good 
faith, either from the interpretation of the parties will
41
. 
 
A major distinction must be draw between contracts with protective effects towards 
third parties and transferred loss. The first protect the third party’ own interest, while 
the second only protects the interest that was transferred from one of the contract’s party 
to the third party. This type of contract subjects the obligor to a greater liability, 
encompassing the liability of the party and of the third party in their specific interests. 
On the contrary, transferred loss is aimed at cases in which the obligor is subject to 
                                                 
40 (Larenz, 2002) 
 
41 (Kannowski) 
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liability for the party’s interest, which was later transferred – so conceptually there is no 
greater liability, simply transferred liability. 
 
The recognition of contracts with protective effects towards third parties would provide 
an answer to most transferred loss cases, is as much as the interest that had been 
transferred to the third party could be protected. However, the strict legal framework in 
which the contract for the benefit of a third party was accepted, renders the acceptability 
of contracts with protective effects towards third parties extremely unlikely. The case 
for contracts with protective effects towards third parties would be extremely difficult to 
uphold since in such case no primary obligation is owed to the parties. 
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III - Transferred loss in English law 
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III.1 – Early developments 
III.1.1 – Early developments in the XVIII and XIX centuries 
 
One of the fields in which the transferred loss problem arose was transportation, namely 
regarding the liability of carriers. In fact, the law of carriage of goods had soon to deal 
with the issue of transferred loss because the series of interrelated contracts often 
existing. 
 
Firstly, it should be noted that the nature of carrier’s liability was highly debated. The 
common carriers’ liability had been held either as ex contractu or ex delicto. And, often 
courts would adjudicate on the matter without establishing any distinction whatsoever. 
 
In this context the Davis and Jordan v James [1770] case emerged. In such case, 
consignors sued the common carrier for not delivering the goods. Naturally, the 
common carrier objected by claiming that the action had to be brought by the consignee. 
Yet, the court considered that the action had been properly brought since the agreement 
had been made between the plaintiff and the defendant – and the former were to pay to 
the latter. By considering that the action had been properly brought, the court departed 
from the proposition according to which property and contract had to coincide. This 
means that in the Davis and Jordan v James case the contract alone provided basis for 
liability. Another case, Moore v. Wilson – though poorly reported – seems to be based 
on similar grounds. In the end, in both cases, the consignor was allowed recovery 
although he was not the owner of the goods. 
 
Though many conceptual issues were not expressly addressed in those judgments, there 
are two underlying considerations: 1) there was ex contractu liability of common 
carriers, 2) a different concept of loss was taken into account. 
 
Both cases were later addressed in Dawes v Peck. In this case the court – purporting a 
strict interpretation - considered those judgments had been based on “special” or 
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“particular” agreements between the parties, because there was a warranty to safely 
carry the goods. 
 
Afterwards, the transferred loss problem was yet given another conceptual framework in 
Joseph v Knox [1813]. Lord Ellenborough rendered the following speech: 
 
“There is a privity of contract established between these parties by means of the 
bill of lading. That states that the goods were shipped by the plaintiffs, and that 
the freight for them was paid by the plaintiffs in London. To the plaintiffs, 
therefore, from whom the consideration moves, and to whom the promise is 
made, the defendant is liable for the non-delivery of the goods. After such a bill 
of lading has been signed by his agent, he cannot say to the shippers they have 
no interest in the goods, and are not damnified by his breach of contract. I think 
the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the value of the goods, and they will hold the 
sum recovered as trustees for the real owner.” 
 
The set of cases quoted above from the XVIII and XIX centuries are based on various 
legal doctrines regarding transferred loss which are still under debate. The Davis and 
Jordan v James (1770), Moore v. Wilson and Joseph v Knox (1813) cases, though 
providing answers to the transferred loss problem, were not part of a uniform precedent. 
On the contrary, such cases can be regarded truly as exceptions to the standard legal 
answer. 
 
III.1.2 – A judicial landmark in the XIX century 
 
In considering the early developments of transferred loss, a Scottish case deserves even 
greater attention because of how it inspired later judgments: the Dunlop v. Lambert 
(1839) case. Dunlop shipped a puncheon of whisky deliverable to Mr Robson
42
.  
 
                                                 
42 The first puncheon was destroyed during the shipment due to bad weather and a second puncheon was 
shipped at no cost.  
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The first issue dealt was the contract between seller and buyer. As Lord Cottenham LC 
asserted, the general rule was that delivery to the carrier amounted to delivery to the 
consignee, unless there was a particular
43
 contract between consignor and consignee. 
 
The second issue dealt was the contract between consignor and carrier. In this domain, 
in order to allow the carrier to be liable, the rule in Dunlop v Lambert emerged: 
 
“These authorities, therefore, my Lords, established these propositions: that 
although, generally speaking, where there is a delivery to a carrier to deliver to 
a consignee,the consignee is the proper person to bring the action against the 
carrier if they should be lost; yet the consignor may have a right to sue if he 
made a special contract with the carrier (…) which special contract supersedes 
the necessity of showing ownership in the goods; and by authority of Davis v 
James (5 Burr 2680), and the last case of Joseph v Knox (3 Camp 320), that the 
consignor is enabled to maintain an action, though the goods may  the goods of 
the consignee”. 
 
 
III.1.3 – A statutory landmark in the XIX century 
 
The uncertainty relating to the judicial precedent in the English law in this matter led to 
the Bills of Lading Act 1855. Section 1 of the Act provides that: 
 
“Every consignee of goods named in a bill of lading and every endorsee of a bill 
of lading of a bill of lading to whom the property in the goods therein mentioned 
shall pass, upon or by reason of such consignment or endorsement, shall have 
transferred and vested in him all rights of suit, and be subject to the same 
liabilities in respect of such goods, as if the contract contained in the bill of 
lading had been made with himself.” 
 
                                                 
43 The precise wording of Lord Cottenham’s speech was “special contract”. Nonetheless, the expression “special 
contract” has a different specific technical sense, so it should not be used.  (Unberath, 2003, pag 106) 
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This section became the governing rule in this matter – upon which the case law was 
rewritten. The bill – in providing remedy in cases of third party loss (not all, but most) – 
ruptures with the standard understanding of privity. Consequently, such rupture also 
departs from compromise solutions as the reasoning adopted in Joseph v Knox (1813). 
 
Paradoxically, the Bill that was enacted as a solution to the shortcomings of privity, was 
later crystallized with its own shortcomings
44
. 
                                                 
44 Adewale A. Olawoyin considers it a phanton to the current law in Nigeria.  (Olawoyin, 2004) 
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III.2 – The Albazero principle 
 
In Albacruz (Cargo Owners) v Albazero (Owners) [1977], commonly known as The 
Albazero [1977] the House of Lords acknowledged a small revolution in the field of 
transferred loss. 
 
The plaintiffs time chartered the Albacruz ship to transport crude oil in bulk. The crude 
oil had been bought by the plaintiffs FOB
45
 and had been sold CIF
46
. As such, under 
CIF, the plaintiffs delivered when the goods were shipped – so it was for the buyer to 
bear the risk of loss or of damage to the goods. 
 
The Albacruz ship sank and the cargo was completely lost. A bill of lading had been 
issued to them as shippers in respect of the cargo pursuant to the charterparty and was 
endorsed to the buyers the day before the ship sank. 
 
The plaintiffs sued arguing there was a breach of the charterparty. Consequently, the 
defendants claimed the property of the cargo had passed to the CIF buyers, so the 
plaintiffs had suffered no loss. Additionally, the buyers could no longer bring 
themselves an action under the bill of lading since it was already time-barred. 
 
III.2.1 – The Court of Appeal 
 
a) The issue of property 
 
                                                 
45 FOB stands for “Free On Board”, which means “that the seller delivers when the goods pass the ship’s rail at the 
named port of shipment. This means that the buyer has to bear all costs and risks of loss of or damage to the goods from that 
point. The FOB term requires the seller to clear the goods for export. This term can be used only for sea or inland waterway 
transport. If the parties do not intend to deliver the goods across the ship’s rail, the FCA term should be used”.  (ICC, 2010) 
46 CIF stands for “Cost, Insurance and freight”, which means “that the seller delivers when the goods pass the ship’s 
rail in the port of shipment. The seller must pay the cost and freight necessary to bring the goods to the named port of destination 
BUT the risk of loss of or damage to the goods, as well as any additional costs due to events occurring after the time of delivery, 
are transferred from the seller to the buyer. However, in CIF the seller also has to procure marine insurance against the buyer’s 
risk of loss of or damage to the goods during the carriage. Consequently, the seller contracts for insurance and pays the insurance 
premium. The buyer should note that under the CIF term the seller in required to obtain insurance only on minimum cover. 
Should the buyer wish to have the protection of greater cover, he would either need to agree as much expressly with the seller or to 
make his own extra insurance arrangements. The CIF term requires the seller to clear the goods for export. This term can be 
used only for sea and inland waterway transport”.  (ICC, 2010b) 
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The court reminded that normally under a CIF contract, the property is only transferred 
when both the shipping documents are received and the price has been paid. The 
purpose of which is to secure the payment of the goods. 
 
Since the Court found that in this case the buyer and the seller were associated 
companies, it wouldn’t have been necessary for the seller (the current plaintiff) to 
reserve the right of disposal to secure payment of the price. Therefore, both property 
and risk were transferred from the seller to the buyer the day before the ship sank, 
through the endorsement of the bill of lading, irrespectively of payment. 
 
b) The consignor’s right to recover damages 
 
More surprisingly, Brandon J  and later the Court of Appeal, concluded that existing 
case law could be construed has to allow the consignor’s right to recover damages even 
when it no longer has any proprietary interest in the goods. 
 
In fact, nineteenth century case law had acknowledged that the consignor could have the 
right to recover substantial damages despite lacking proprietary interest, provided a 
“special contract” between the consignor and the carrier could be construed47. Brandon 
J and the Court of Appeal were calling upon, and eventually extending, Dunlop v 
Lambert
48
. 
 
The Court of Appeal’s judgment was influenced, according to Ormrod LJ’s speech, by 
the fact that not to consider the Dunlop v Lambert rule applicable would allow the 
defendants to “escape liability on what on the facts of this case is the merest 
technicality”. 
 
 
 
III.2.2 – The House Of Lords 
 
 
                                                 
47 Compare with Mead v South Eastern Railway Co (1870) 
48  (Dunlop v. Lambert, 1839) 
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a) Rationalization of the “special contract”  
 
The House of Lords, adhering to Lord Diplock’s speech, further developed and 
rationalized the grounds on which the lower courts had concluded that the consignor 
might be allowed to recover damages irrespectively of any proprietary interest in the 
goods. 
 
It is understood from Lord Diplock’s speech that the concept of “special contract” ought 
to be abandoned as it remained a vestige with procedural connotations of the long 
abolished forms of action. As such the concept of “special contract” should give place 
to the intention of the parties to allow recovery for damages on behalf of a third party. 
 
In Lord Diplock’s own words: 
  
“The only way in which I find it possible to rationalize the rule in Dunlop v 
Lambert so that it may fit into the pattern of English law is to treat it as an 
application of the principle, accepted also in relation to policies of insurance 
upon goods, that in a commercial contract concerning goods where it is in the 
contemplation of the parties that the proprietary interest in the goods may be 
transferred from one owner to another after the contract has been entered into 
and before the breach which causes loss or damage to the goods, an original 
party to the contract, if such be the intention of them both, is to be treated in law 
as having entered into the contract for the benefit of all persons who have or 
may acquire an interest in the goods before they are lost or damaged, and is 
entitled to recover by way of damages for breach of contract the actual loss 
sustained by those for whose benefit the contract in entered into.” (Emphasis 
added). 
 
b) Direct third party rights  
 
Taking into consideration that such contract for the benefit of all persons emerged from 
the intention of the parties, Lord Diplock also concluded that there was no sensible 
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business reason for the transporter to accept liability for the same damage to both the 
consignor and the consignee. In as much, “where there are two contracts with the 
carrier covering the same carriage and under one of them there is privity of contract 
between the person who actually sustains the loss and the carrier”. 
 
Furthermore, under the reasoning of Lord Diplock, a consignor’s right to recover 
damages couldn’t be construed as to surpass the time-bar prescribed by the Bills of 
Lading Act 1855 – which prevented the consignee himself from recovering damages. 
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III.3 – Panatown: A new beginning 
 
III.3.1 – Precedents in construction law 
 
 
In the twentieth century a series of cases in the field of construction law have 
questioned the scope of the Albazero principle, paving the way for Alfred McAlpine 
Construction Lta v Panatown Ltd. The following cases are of special importance to 
understanding the evolution of transferred loss in English Law: Linden Gardens Trust 
Ltd [1992], St Martins Property Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd [1992], 
Darlington BC v Wiltshier Northern Ltd [1995]. 
 
a) Linden Gardens and St Martins cases 
 
This two cases were heard together by the House of Lords. In the first (Linden 
Gardens
49
) the property was transferred after the breach of the contract in relation to 
such property. In the second (St Martins
50
), the property was transferred before the 
breach of the contract in relation to such property. 
 
In St Martins the original contracting party judicially claimed compensation. Two 
alternative conceptual paths to recovery emerged: the so called “narrow ground” and the 
so called “broad ground”. 
 
According to Lord Griffiths, applying the “broad ground” of recovery, the plaintiffy 
could recover because it had sustained the loss the itself. The “broad ground” of 
recovery became the doctrine according to which, in case of default of contractual 
obligations, the contracting party suffers a nominal loss in the value of the non-
performed obligation – even though no proprietary interest was damaged. As such, 
under the “broad ground” of recovery, loss isn’t the value of the unperformed benefit, 
but the value of the performance itself. As a result, even though the contract brings a 
                                                 
49  (Linden Gardens Trust Ltd, 1992) 
50  (St Martins Property Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd, 1992) 
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benefit to a third party, in case of default there is a loss to the contracting party, as what 
it paid for wasn’t performed. 
 
On the contrary, Lord Brown-Wilkinson, Lord Keith and Lord Bridge of Harwhich, 
applying the “narrow ground”, awarded compensation to the contracting party, though 
recognizing it had suffered no loss. As derives from the leading speech by Lord Brown-
Wilkinson, the court followed the Albazero principle: 
 
“[I]t could be foreseen that damages caused by a breach would cause loss to a 
latter owner and not merely to the original contracting party (…) McAlpine [the 
defendant] had specifically contracted that the rights under the building contract 
could not without McAlpine‟s consent be transferred to third parties who 
became owners or occupiers and might suffer loss. In such case, it seems to me 
proper, as in the case of the carriage of goods by land, to treat the parties as 
having entered into the contract on the footing that Corporation [the plaintiff] 
would be entitled to enforce contractual rights for the benefit of those who 
suffered from defective performance but who, under the terms of the contract, 
could not acquire any right to hold Mc Alpine liable for the breach.”51 
 
The above quote does indeed comprise an application of the Albazero principle in as 
much as it takes the intention of the parties as the ground to allow a contracting party to 
recover third party loss. Still, it should be noted that it includes a reference to 
foreseeablility, which was never explicitly referred in Lord Diplock’s speech in 
Albazero (where the concept of “contemplation” was applied instead). 
 
Furthermore, it is open for debate if such contract could in fact be derived from the 
intention of the parties or if I was simply the legal mechanism chosen by the Law Lords 
to fill a black hole and correct injustice. When a party to a contract restricts the 
assignment of rights to third parties is intention may very well be to limit its own 
liability, which would be contrary to allowing the other contracting party to claim the 
losses of others. In fact, under Lord Brown-Wilkinson speech it appears that an the 
intention to allow recovery for third parties (the intention to enter into a contract “for 
                                                 
51  (St Martins Property Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd, 1992) 
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the benefit” of third parties) derives from the foreseeability of third party loss – as if a 
presumption were raised. 
 
As such, one must take into account that Lord Brown-Wilkinson reasoning was inspired 
from the fact that, if it weren’t for the Albazero principle: 
 
“neither of the plaintiffs has any right to substantial damages; [the current 
owner] has incurred damages (…) but has no cause of action; [the former 
owner] has a cause of action but has suffered no loss. If this is right, in the 
words of my noble and learned friend, Lord Keith of Kinkel (…) „the claim to 
damages would disappear (…) into some legal black hole, so that the wrongdoer 
escaped scot-free.”52 
  
 
b) Darlington BC v Wiltshier Northern Ltd 
 
A town council entered into a contract with a finance company, according to which the 
latter would arrange for a recreational center to be built in Darlington and the former 
would pay the sums falling under the building contract. In addition, a deed was entered 
into by the three parties (town council, finance company and construction company), 
giving the council direct contractual rights against the construction company for failure 
to complete the construction on time. 
 
After the construction had been completed, the council filled an action against the 
construction company for defective building, due to bad workmanship. Two separate 
conceptual paths for recovery were considered by the House of Lords: constructive trust 
and the Albazero principle. 
 
Dillon LJ considered that the finance company was a constructive trustee for the council 
of the benefit of any rights under or for the breach of the building contract – being, as 
such, analogous to Lloyd’s v Harper. The other members of the high court found it 
difficult to accept Dillon LJ’s reasoning in this case because in parallel to such contract 
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there was a tripartite deed. Thus, it can be argued that if the finance company was acting 
as a trustee, then there would be no need for the council to take directly part in the deed.  
 
As a result, the Law Lords turned to the following question: can the Dunlop v Lambert 
rule, as rationalized in the Albazero principle and eventually extended through St 
Martins be applicable in this case? Another difficulty rose in answering this question. It 
this case no contractual or proprietary rights had shifted between the contracting party 
and the relevant third party. The contracting party never had a proprietary interest in the 
construction which had been developed. In answering the question, the House of Lords 
concluded that the foreseeablity test had been met (it was obvious that the building was 
being constructed for the benefit of the council) and the lack of proprietary interest from 
the out set wasn’t a compelling objection. According to Steyn LJ this would be a limited 
and conservative extension of the Albazero principle. 
 
 
c) Bovis 
 
The facts of this case, according to Staughton LJ, constitute “a tangled web of 
complications”. The site owners employed developers to carry out a large residential 
development. The owners and developers are associated companies. The developers 
entered into construction management agreements with the managers, by which the 
latter would supervise the development. The developers contracted a loan from a 
syndicate of banks, though a finance company acting as agent. The developer’s rights 
were assigned to the finance company. In due time, shire had been repaid and the rights 
were reassigned to the developers. 
 
The managers filled an action against the developers, claiming the payment of fees and 
disbursements. The developers counterclaimed for breach of contract, delay and causing 
increased expense. 
 
Did the developers suffer any loss despite the delay and increased expense? On the one 
hand, the developers did not have any proprietary interest in the land. On the other 
hand, the developers were reimbursed under the contract with the land owners of theirs 
costs. Even if considering the developers had suffered loss, could the developers recover 
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damages when at the time of breach the cause of action was assigned to the finance 
company and the finance company had suffered no loss? 
 
Millett LJ solved the problem of an “apparent separation of loss and remedy”53 through 
the application of agency law principles. According to such analogy, the damages were 
hold on trust for the “principals”.  
 
 
 
III.3.2 – The Panatown case 
 
a) The facts 
 
UIPL owned a land where it intended to develop a building. For tax reasons, Panatown 
(a company from the same group) employed McAlpine to develop such building. 
Panatown received the funds for the construction from the parent company and its main 
obligation was to enter into a building contract with a construction company 
(McAlpine). In addition, McAlpine entered into a Duty of Care Deed with UIPL, under 
which the building owner acquired a direct remedy against the construction company 
for failure to exercise reasonable skill and care under the building contract. 
 
After McAlpine completed the construction, the building was found to be defective and 
required significant repair work, Panatown filled an action claiming compensation for 
breaches of the building contract by McAlpine, due to defective work and delay. 
 
b) The Court of Appeal 
 
Several key legal issues were discussed in Panatown. First and foremost it was 
questioned if a general rule under which the plaintiff could only claim his/hers own loss 
did really exist. The plaintiff quoted Mr Wallace and Prof Treitel
54
, interpreting their 
words as denying such general rule. Lord Millett, accompanied by every other lordship 
                                                 
53  (Unberath, 2003, pag 202) 
54  (Unberath, 2003, pag 207) 
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except Lord Goff
55, considered such general rule to be “self-evident”. As Cairns LJ had 
referred in The Albazero, it is “so fundamental to our law that nobody in this case has 
thought it necessary to cite authority for it”56. 
 
Evans LJ speech reaffirms the general rule that third parties losses cannot be recovered, 
except if the parties to the contract so intended. As such, parties could agree to enhance 
the scope of contractually protected interests. It is a contractual approach to the narrow 
ground. 
 
c) The House of Lords 
 
The House of Lords took the opportunity to depart from the apparently intention based 
contract-approach of The Albazero and St Martins. As Lord Clyde expressed: 
 
“In my view it is preferable to regard it as a solution imposed by the law and not 
as arising from the supposed intention of the parties, who may in reality not 
have applied their minds to the point.” 
 
In addition, Lord Clyde also accepted (obiter dictum) that foreseeability or 
contemplation of third party loss were unnecessary and, even more clearly, the narrow 
ground was irrespective of foreseeability. Lord Clyde’s view was welcomed by Lord 
Jauncey and Lord Browne-Wilkinson only in as much as foreseeability or 
contemplation of third party loss still needed to be established. 
 
In his speech, Lord Clyde, properly identified Panatown as a transferred loss case: 
 
“What is there propounded is, as was noticed by my noble and learned friend 
Lord Goff of Chieveley in White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207, 267, a case of 
transferred loss. This is not a situation where the loss that of the promise. It is a 
loss suffered by the third party but transferred to the promise who is then 
                                                 
55 Lord Goff criticises a too rigid interpretation of the principle and professes a solution to the transferred 
loss issue which is overall consistent with such general rule (the broad ground). 
56  (Albacruz (Cargo Owners) v Albazero (Owners), 1977) 
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accountable to the third party (…) The promise is deemed to have suffered the 
loss so that it is he and not the third party who is able to pursue the remedy in 
damages”.57 
 
 
III.3.3 – After Panatown 
 
 
Following Panatown, English Courts have faced other cases in which the transferred 
loss issue has been put forward. Among such cases, two are most notably worth 
mentioning: the John Harris Partnership v Groveworld [1999] and the And So to Bed v 
Dixon [2000] case. 
 
Regarding the first case, one may conclude from the decision by Judge Thornton that 
Panatown’s reasoning is applicable to all services contracts58. More surprisingly, Judge 
Thorton considers – as obiter dicta – that “Groveworld [the promisee] as an equitable 
obligation to pursue JRH [the obligor] for the loss caused to Frogmore [the third 
party] by JRH [the obligor] and a duty to account to Frogmore [the third party] for any 
recovery”. Accordingly, in cases of transferred loss, there would be not only a right to 
claim such third party loss, but an obligation to claim such loss
59
. It should be 
highlighted that such statement can hardly be regarded as a persuasive precedent, taking 
into consideration it is obiter dicta and was rendered by a lower court. 
 
The second case is a remainder that law’s evolution is a dialectic process. In the And So 
to Bed v Dixon, David Donaldson QC makes use of the intention based approach 
applied by Evans LJ in the Court of Appeal in Panatown, departing from the House of 
Lords’ objective approach. Furthermore, David Donaldson QC provides a clear 
reminder that: 
“There are numerous situations in which C may foresseably suffer loss in 
consequence of the breach by B og his contract with A without C having a cause 
                                                 
57  (Alfred McAlpine Construction Lta v Panatown Ltd, 1998) 
58  (Jackson & Sutherland) 
59  (Unberath, 2003, pag 218) 
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of action against B, and it cannot be in every such case that even in a rational 
and coherent legal system it will be requisite that A should recover damages 
encompassing C‟s loss.”60 
  
                                                 
60  (And So to Bed v Dixon, 2000) 
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IV - From fragmentation to a general principle 
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IV.1 – Fragmentation of transferred loss 
 
Transferred loss issues have not only been raised within several fields of law, but have 
been considered under different conceptual frameworks. On the one hand, transferred 
loss issues have arisen most notably in Transportation Law and Construction Law. On 
the other hand, the array of judicial answers to transferred loss includes considering 
there is no remedy, the so-called narrow ground and the so-called broad ground. 
 
Not limited to transportation and construction law, transferred loss cases can also be 
identified in sale of goods cases (often related to transportation law cases), tenancy 
cases, services cases, among others. The specificity of transportation law (to be more 
precise, the carriage of goods) has been addressed supra, taking into account for 
instance the Bills of Lading Act 1855. The specificity of construction law lies 
frequently in existing collaterals. The specificity of tenancy cases is greatly summoned 
by policy reasons. 
 
Therefore, not only in light of the fragmentation which is proper to a case-by-case 
precedent-forming judicial system, but also in light of such specificities, judicial 
answers to transferred loss have not been uniform. 
 
Unberath
61
 interprets tenancy cases, sale of goods cases and carriage of goods cases as 
having – within their own specificities – to have contributed to the broad road approach; 
while new developments in construction law have taken the narrow road. As we shall 
see infra, despite fragmentation, both approaches (broad and narrow) pave the way for a 
uniform answer. 
  
                                                 
61 (Unberath, 2003, pag 36-51) 
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IV.2 – An apparent exception? 
 
 
As we have seen, transferred loss initially appears as opposed to the doctrine of privity, 
eventually constituting an exception to such doctrine. On the one hand, privity is based 
on the assumption that, as a matter of fact, no one but the parties to a contract can 
benefit from its performance and suffer loss from its non-performance. On the other 
hand, the transferred loss debate is based on an apparently opposed assumption: the lack 
of performance of a contract may have effects outside the strict scope of the parties. 
 
A question must be answered: When and why does the lack of performance affect third 
parties? 
 
Firstly: the third party may simply rely on the performance, without any contractual 
relation to any of the parties to the main contract, which could still eventually indirectly 
contribute to its own undertakings, thus having an expectation. In such case, the lack of 
performance of the main contract may remotely contribute to a loss of the third party. 
 
Secondly: the third party may have a contractual relation with one of the parties to the 
main contract, both contracts with related subject matters, thus having an indirect 
contractual relation. In such case, the lack of performance of the main contract could 
determine a loss of the third party. 
 
The doctrine of privity is often presented as preventing compensation in both 
circumstances. As under a contract only the promisee could claim compensation and 
compensation could only be claimed for one’s loss, then the loss of third parties could 
not be compensated (except where it could fall within tort law). The main policy 
argument for so is the flood-gate argument: If compensation were to be allowed 
regarding third party loss, then contractual parties would face unlimited liability, for an 
unlimited time, towards an unlimited number of people. 
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In addition to specific qualifications to the privaty doctrine, two general paths (inspired 
from the recent developments of German law) have been: contracts with protective 
effects towards third parties or transferred loss (subdivided in two paths, narrow and 
broad). 
 
The path of contracts with protective effects towards third parties could provide an 
answer to third party loss, both in cases of simple expectations and of indirect 
contractual relations – provided the third parties interest ought to be protected (being 
difficult to ascribe objective criteria in determining when should such protection be 
awarded). As we have seen, this path would be contrary to a recent development of the 
English law of contract: the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Acts 1999 
 
The path of transferred loss is a common heading for several doctrinal solutions to a 
more specific problem: when a third party was harmed in an interest that had been 
transferred from the promisee, is as much as if the interest handn’t been transferred, the 
loss would have been suffered by the promisee. 
 
A legal answer to the third party loss issue is seen as contrary to legal principles and to 
legal policy mostly because it would imply an exponential increase of contractual 
liability, beyond the parties will, beyond the strict contractual scope and with 
unforeseen results. A legal answer to the transferred loss issue (which is a specific 
concept within the broader third party loss) may be considered as needed in light of the 
very same principles and policy, because otherwise contractual parties could be exempt 
from liability. 
 
As such, instead of regarding transferred loss as opposed to privity, transferred loss may 
be understood as fulfilling the demands of privity. The doctrine of privity oughtn’t be 
merely considered from the view point that third party cannot claim benefit (or 
compensation for non-performance) from the contract. By accepting the assertion that 
the performance or non-performance or defective performance of a contract is a matter 
between the parties only and third parties cannot claim compensation under a contract 
between others, then privity should also demand for liability to arise between the parties 
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– irrespectively of it having been transferred to third parties. If not, under privity, third 
party’s acts would be considered in order to relieve the contractual party’s liability, 
while the same acts would be discard to recognize the very same loss caused to a 
different subject. 
 
This issue is at the heart of the distinction between the narrow and the broad road. The 
narrow road envisages a new principle (or an exception to privity, depending on its 
different formulations), while, the broad road makes use of a wide interpretation of 
privity itself. Generraly,under the broad road, the obligor is liable to the promissee for 
the cost of attaining the expected performance – irrespectively of the interests bearer. 
 
In the end, is transferred loss truly an exception to the privity doctrine? No definite 
answer can be given for one simple reason: the several solutions put forward for the 
transferred loss problem lack a common core in this matter. 
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IV.3 – The building of a general principle 
IV.3.1 – The narrow road and the Albazero principle 
 
As we have seen, the narrow road is the ground for recovery that was authoritatively 
recognized in the Albazero case (though its routes can be traced back to a century 
earlier). Under the so-called Albazero principle, a contract can be deemed to be a 
contract for the benefit of all persons who have or may acquire an interest in the goods. 
 
The narrow road brings the issue of transferred loss close to the debate regarding 
privity. In fact, the narrow road challenges the way how privity has been conceived and 
even surmounts the Third Party Rights act (perceived as the answer to the shortcomings 
of privity).  
 
So far the issue of transferred loss had primarily been dealt by the Courts through the 
narrow road within the field of carriage of goods. As such, through the Bills of Lading 
Act, which provided a statutory answer to the transferred loss issue in the carriage of 
goods field, the narrow road had lost relevance.  
 
The developments in construction law revived the narrow road. The leading speech in 
the Saint Martins case, by Lord Browne-Wilkinson, is clear in this matter: “[I]t seems to 
me proper, as in the case of the carriage of goods by land, to treat the parties as having 
entered into the contract on the footing that (…) [one party] would be entitled to 
enforce contractual rights for the benefit of those who suffered from defective 
performance”. 
 
IV.3.2 – From an intention based to an objective approach 
 
 
The narrow road greatly evolved since it was judicially recognized as the Albazero 
principle. In Albazero a contractual approach was adopted in solving the transferred loss 
issue. Albazero’s “contract for the benefit of all persons who have or may acquire an 
interest in the goods” is based on the parties’ intention to acknowledge third party loss. 
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As we have seen through out the preceding chapters, English courts have had either 
overtly intention based approaches, either unclear approaches regarding the need to 
demonstrate the parties intentions. In this context, Panatown was a cornerstone in 
shifting towards an objective approach. 
 
An intention based approach, requiring courts to determine whether the parties wanted 
third party damages to be compensated (or whether if they would have wanted so, in 
case they had considered the possibility of third party damages) relies in judicial 
interpretation. An objective approach operates through defined legal criteria, 
irrespectively of the parties will.  
 
The answer is not yet definite, but there is a clear tendency for attaining an objective 
solution. For a case-by-case intention test approach, courts moved to a wider legal 
fiction and with Panatown an objective approach was attained. 
 
This objective approach in which legally loss suffered by the third party but transferred 
to the promise is then accountable to the third party may have prevailed in Panatown 
due to the then existing court composition. This issue remains controversial and the 
current stare decisis may be overturned. 
 
IV.3.3 – From fragmentation to a general principle 
 
 
The fragmentation of transferred loss (that is to say, the emergence of transferred loss 
issues in determined fields of law, owing to specific circumstances), hasn’t detained the 
Courts from gradually attempting to bring the several judicial decisions into a coherent 
system. 
 
In fact, transferred loss was first clearly identified in the law of transportation – 
receiving a specific statutory answer. Yet, latter, when facing the very same conceptual 
problem under the different circumstances of a different field of law, English courts 
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retained and enhanced the dogmatic framework which had been developed for 
transferred loss in the law of transportation, prior to the specific statutory answer. 
 
Undeniably, the judicial and scholarly legal development of transferred loss has been 
chiefly conducted within the law of construction’s field. The role of St Martins, 
Darlington and Panatown cases can hardly be over emphasized. 
 
Still, the solutions judicially put forward for the transferred loss issue do not offer any 
conceptual resistance to their applicability in other fields of law. Whether one considers 
the parties actual or presumed intention to contractually encompass transferred loss, a 
standing legal fiction or an objective approach, nothing prevents their applicability in 
other fields. 
 
Moreover, the legal reasoning adopted by English courts in this matter is formulated in 
general terms, so as to express general rules of law, not limited to the strict scope of a 
given law field. In light of the XXth century judicial development of the narrow road, 
the narrow road could arguably be interpreted as instituting a principle of transferred 
loss, irrespectively of how privity is to be construed. 
 
Once again, taking into account the away how privity has been uphold, the flood-gate 
arguments, and overall the opposition transferred loss faces, this wide conception of a 
transferred loss principle risks being overturned. 
 
IV.3.4 – An alternative route: extending the concept of loss 
 
 
An alternative route exists and should not be promptly dismissed. Transferred loss 
issues are raised from the transfer of interest from the promisee to a third party, is as 
much as it is said that the loss for non-performance or defective performance is 
sustained by the third party. It is true that the financial loss is sustained by the third 
party. Ultimately, when the interest has been shifted, it is the third party that may be 
harmed. 
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Nevertheless, a broader concept of damages could be taken into account. The promisee 
has given consideration, owed in view of the obligor’s performance. If the consideration 
is provided but there is no performance, then – has not only the obligor enriched62  - the 
promise has lost. The performance itself as value. The lack of performance has a 
specific cost to it: to cost of having another render the expected performance or to repair 
the consequences of it having not been performed. 
 
In this context, the “broad ground” of recovery is the doctrine according to which, in 
case of default of contractual obligations, the contracting party suffers a nominal loss in 
the value of the non-performed obligation – even though no proprietary interest was 
damaged.  
 
This is the path purported by Lord Griffiths and, to some extent, Lord Goff – which was 
rejected in Panatown. As decided in Panatown, “a breach of contract may cause loss 
but is not itself a loss in any meaningful sense”. As such, the courts have adopted a 
rather restrictive interpretation of the principle according to which damages for breach 
of contract should restore “so far as money can do it (…) the same situation (…) as if 
the contract had been performed”. 
 
It should be noted, however, that if such broad road were to be applied, it might not be 
as far reaching as a transferred loss principle, by not expressly addressing the third party 
and having as a reference the value of the performance.  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
62 Which could ultimately even lead to a discussion on the applicability of an unjust enrichment regime. 
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V - Conclusion 
 
The first conclusion to be drawn on this matter is the complexity of the transferred issue 
within the context of third party loss and the complexity of the existing legal 
framework. No legal study can be entertained regarding this subject without broadly 
encompassing the various fields of law (from tort to contract, from carriage of goods to 
construction law). In fact, transferred loss presents itself as a challenge to lawyers, in 
which legal paradigms and public policy are confronted, leading to an array of – hard to 
reconcile – answer. 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of the subject and the enriching existing case-law, the 
topic has often remained under the scholar’s radar. Several papers question the role of 
third party loss (and transferred loss) in each specific field of law, but rather few dwell 
into a comprehensive analysis. And among those, there is a perceived influence of 
German legal reasoning. 
 
A second conclusion is related to the doctrine of privity. As it was shown, several 
qualifications to such doctrine are known and transferred loss cases may predate its 
clear establishment. Therefore, although it is an important doctrine in the English law of 
contract, solutions can be sought outside its strict scope and complementary principles 
may be developed or rediscovered. 
 
Last, but not least, there are currently clear reasons to consider a transferred loss 
principle is emerging. One might dare – in light of recent judicial developments – to 
claim that following Panatown a general principle of transferred loss has emerged, 
reshaping English law in general. Yet, caution is advised. The development of law – and 
in particular the development of English law – is often a dialectic process. The English 
legal world has moved from a thesis of non-recoverability of third party loss, to an 
antithesis of narrow road transferred loss. 
 
Will the narrow ground be the final synthesis or will the broad ground be favored? 
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